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The View from Down Under:
Freedom of the Press in Canada
James Allan
In this paper I hope to take a look at the scope of press freedom in
certain respects under Canada’s entrenched, constitutionalized Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 and to do so through Australian eyes.
Of course I myself am only a transplant to Down Under. If you could
hear me you could tell immediately that my speaking voice sounds pretty
much the way you would expect from someone who was born and raised
in Toronto, went to university at Queen’s, married and worked as a
lawyer on Bay Street and then moved to London, England to work at the
Bar, then moved to Hong Kong for four years, then to New Zealand for
eleven, and finally to Australia for the last eight years — always one step
ahead of extradition as I like to say.
And all those moves from Hong Kong onwards have been to take up
jobs teaching public law in universities. So my accent notwithstanding, I
have a lot more experience of constitutional law in the Antipodes than
here and also of seeing Canadian constitutional law from an offshore
vantage.
My paper will try to give you a taste of that foreigner’s perspective
by comparing the scope of freedom of the press in Canada, with its
Charter, and in Australia where (almost uniquely in the democratic
world) there is no national bill of rights of any sort. (And to lay my cards
on the table I should tell you straight out that I dislike all types of bills of
rights — on democratic grounds2 — a view shared by only a small
category of legal academics in Canada.)

Garrick Professor of Law, University of Queensland. This paper was first delivered on
March 9, 2012 at the Ryerson University “Press Freedom in Canada: A Status Report on the 30th
Anniversary of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” Conference in Toronto. It is made available
with the permission of the organizers of that conference. The author thanks Jamie Cameron for her
comments on an earlier version of this paper, as well as the participants in the above conference.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
See, e.g., James Allan, “Bills of Rights and Judicial Power – A Liberal’s Quandary?”
(1996) 16 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 337; James Allan, Sympathy and Antipathy: Essays Legal and
Philosophical (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2002); James Allan, “Rights, Paternalism, Constitutions
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However, before I move on to the Canada-Australia comparison of
the scope of press freedom, I need to do three things. First, I need to give
you at least a basic account of why free speech and a free press matter.
My answer falls squarely in the utilitarian John Stuart Mill tradition,
which argues that in the long term the best consequences for any society
flow from allowing the vigorous, untrammelled competition of ideas and
views and speech, however hurtful or offensive or character-impugning
they might be to some listeners and readers.
If you want to put it in unqualified terms, here is how John Milton
did so back in 1644:
Let Truth and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter? (Areopagitica)

Or if you prefer, here is how I would make the point, namely, that the
sort of free speech that matters is the kind that offends, disturbs, unsettles
and bothers people. A protection or guarantee of free speech where the
topic is one everyone agrees about is worthless. It does not do anything.
If we are all sitting in a circle, holding hands, with someone strumming
on the guitar while we hum “Kumbaya” together then enforceable
protections for free speech simply are not needed. You need protections
for speech (and newspaper published speech) when the content is not
something with which you already agree, when it offends you, when it
challenges you, when you would rather not hear it at all.
And the main reason I think this sort of speech needs protecting is
the one — as I said — that John Stuart Mill gave.3 That the best alternatives or social solutions — or perhaps sometimes the least bad ones —

and Judges” in Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth, eds., Litigating Rights: Perspectives from
Domestic and International Law (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2002) 29; James Allan,
“Oh That I Were Made Judge in the Land” (2002) 30 Fed. L. Rev. 561; James Allan, “Paying for the
Comfort of Dogma” (2003) 25 Sydney L. Rev. 63; James Allan, “A Modest Proposal” (2003) 23
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 197; James Allan, “An Unashamed Majoritarian” (2004) 27 Dal. L.J. 537;
James Allan, “Portia, Bassanio or Dick the Butcher? Constraining Judges in the Twenty-First
Century” (2006) 17 King’s College L.J. 1; James Allan, “Thin Beats Fat Yet Again – Conceptions of
Democracy” (2006) 25 Law & Phil. 533; James Allen, “The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities: Exegesis and Criticism” (2006) 30 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 906; “Public Conversation
on Constitutionalism and the Judiciary between Professor James Allan and the Honourable Michael
Kirby” (2009) 33 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 1032; “Statutory Bills of Rights: You Read Words In, You
Read Words Out, You Take Parliament’s Clear Intentions and You Shake Them All About – Doin’
the Sankey Hanky Panky” in T. Campbell, K. Ewing & A. Tomkins, eds., The Legal Protection of
Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 108; and The Vantage of
Law: Its Role in Thinking about Law, Judging and Bills of Rights (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2011).
3
As in J.S. Mill, On Liberty (first published in 1865).
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will emerge from the cauldron of vigorous, heated debate, mockery and
exchange of views. Most speech, most of the time, ought to be tolerated.
A corollary of that is that all of us living in free, democratic societies
have an obligation to grow thick skins, to toughen up. We do not get the
misguided luxury of playing the victim, of stifling talk and words that we
find hurtful. And we don’t get that luxury because every once in a while
— no one knows for sure when — those hurtful words are making a
powerful point — as they did, say, in the U.S. South in the 1950s and
1960s.
No one can expect good long-term consequences to flow when government and bureaucrats and overzealous human rights commissioners
become the arbiters of what can and cannot be said.4
So having plenty of scope for citizens in a democracy to speak their
minds matters, and it matters however seemingly misguided, erroneous
and distasteful their words might be. And notice that saying that is
wholly consistent with accepting that no society will ever be able to
make the entitlement of free speech an absolute right. Even in the U.S.,
where at least in formal legal terms there is more protection of speech
than anywhere else on the planet, even there there is no protection for
speech that counsels murder or details how to make some virulent
biological weapon or much else besides.
We are talking relativities here. We may trade scope to speak off
against the clear need to stop counselling a likely murder, or even a
knowingly false statement aimed at character assassination. But we want
the line drawn with as much protection for speech as we can stomach
when it comes to words we merely disagree with or find offensive. The
long-term good consequences of this are simply too clear and too
valuable.
So that is why I think free speech matters. And, as everyone attending a symposium on freedom of the press already realizes, a free press
lies at the very heart of any tolerably functioning social system protecting free speech. Indeed, in practical terms a free press is the most
important aspect of living in a society that affords lots of scope to free
speech.
That was my first preliminary point, setting out why free speech and
a free press matter.

4
Those comments should make it plain that I am a strong opponent of the Macleans/Mark
Steyn type speech suppressing litigation which I elaborate upon below.
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The second thing I need to do before embarking on a CanadianAustralian free press comparison is to show you, briefly, just how
constitutionally similar these two countries are in terms of history and
political structure. Pick the country in the world most similar to Canada
and it would be Australia.
Why? Well, they are both products of the British Empire, with all the
shared history that entails. In particular, that means that they share the
common law, a Westminster parliamentary system of government, a
myriad of shared political conventions, and the same head of state to this
day. They are also both very, very large countries with federal (not
unitary) systems, though when the Australian founding fathers came to
choose what sort of federal system to have in the late 1890s they opted
for the American model over the Canadian one.5
Likewise, both Canada and Australia are bicameral (or two legislative chambers) systems, though again the Australian founding fathers
shunned the Canadian/United Kingdom model of an unelected Upper
House in favour of the American model of an elected Genuine Upper
House of Review that looks palatable in the democratic era.6
I suppose while mentioning differences I might add that Australia’s
constitutional amending formula, section 128 of its Constitution that
requires a national referendum (with a proposed amendment needing 50
per cent plus one of voters nationally as well as in over half the states),
was copied from Switzerland (with Canada’s and America’s “ask-thepoliticians-only” models being rejected) so as to introduce a dollop of
direct democracy into attempts to amend the Constitution Down Under.
And Australia operates a compulsory voting system, which I did not
much like when I arrived Down Under but now have changed my mind
about and think preferable.7 At the very least it avoids the now abysmal
Canadian voter turnout figures while leaving political parties free to
concentrate on their message rather than putting lots of resources into
getting out the vote.
Yet those differences notwithstanding, Australia is clearly and undoubtedly Canada’s closest cousin in overall constitutional terms.

5
So the Australian drafters opted for a list of enumerated powers for the central government alone, the residue going to the states, rather than the Canadian-style option of enumerating the
powers of both the centre and the provinces.
6
In Australia, as in the U.S., each state is given the same number of senators. In Australia
it is currently 12 senators for each state, with only six contesting each election on a rolling basis.
7
See James Allan, “In Praise of Compulsory Voting” (May 2012) 56 Quadrant 36.
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That brings us to the last of my preliminary points, namely, a few
words about the Charter. Now truth be told, and whatever well-founded
patriotism might incline you to think, the Charter has not travelled
particularly well. Canada’s model of a bill of rights was explicitly
rejected by New Zealand in 1990 and by the United Kingdom in 1998. It
was seen as too potent in terms of transferring power to unelected judges
to draw debatable, disputed policy lines over a host of social issues about
which smart, well-informed, nice people simply disagree.8
Put more bluntly, the Charter was seen as just as counter-majoritarian
as the U.S. Bill of Rights, notwithstanding the section 33 notwithstanding clause, which most everyone by now realizes has never once been
used at the federal level — not one single time in three decades.
Whether one happens to agree with that democracy-enervating characterization of the Charter or not (and I do), the fact remains it is not a
much-copied model. If you find that claim too provocative then let us say
that the power to strike down or invalidate legislation is not much copied
in the Commonwealth. And when it comes to Australia the Charter and
its judicial power-enhancing effects were regularly cited by opponents
during recent attempts to adopt or enact some sort of bill of rights.9
In fact, Australia’s history as regards attempts to achieve some sort
of bill of rights is basically this: there have been two constitutional
amendment referenda asking the voters if they want one, the most recent
in 1988. Both lost badly, the 1988 one losing in every single state in
Australia. And with any Canadian or U.S.-style constitutional bill of
rights thereby off the table (and it would be a fun counter-factual to
wonder if Pierre Trudeau could have got the Charter through if he had
had to get the agreement of a majority of voters nationally and in a
8
There is a school of thought that points to overseas citations of Canadian Charter decisions to argue that it is, contrary to my views above, a much copied or mimicked instrument. I think
that view is wrong for two main reasons. First, Canada’s two-stage Charter analyses — where most
of the work is done in stage 2 when assessing s. 1 reasonableness — make it easier to make (and
hence have cited elsewhere) expansive obiter rights comments than in the U.S., where all the work
of deciding if a right applies and what limitation is reasonable is done in one stage. (See my review
of Kent Roach’s The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue? (Toronto:
Irwin, 2001), in “The Author Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks” (2003) 20 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 519.)
Second, there is in my view a clear ratchet-up effect when it comes to courts citing overseas rights
decisions, and this is combined with a cherry-picking effect — the core point being that the overseas
judgment is not driving the decision, it is window-dressing for a view reached on other grounds. This
argument is made in James Allan, Grant Huscroft & Nessa Lynch, “The Citation of Overseas
Authority in Rights Litigation in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?” (2007) 11
Otago L. Rev. 433.
9
See James Allan, “You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: No Bill of Rights for
Australia” (2010) 24 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 179.
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majority of provinces, the Australian amending requirement), proponents
shifted to arguing for a New Zealand-style statutory bill of rights,
especially after 2007 and the election of a seemingly pro-bill of rights
Labor government. But public opposition was too great to proceed even
with that model.10
A Canadian audience may well find the concept of opposing a bill of
rights sufficiently unfathomable to want to ask why anyone would do
such a thing, so let me highlight the main grievances. The core of the
case against is that all rights in a bill of rights — and none more so than
the right to free speech — embody vague, amorphous moral abstractions
pitched at such a high level of indeterminacy that they effectively finesse
all disagreement. Bills of rights are articulated up in the Olympian
heights of moral abstractions (right to free speech, right to equality, and
so on) where all is consensus and agreement, but they have real effect
down in the quagmire of detail (where to draw the lines in a defamation
regime or campaign finance system or setup that outlaws speech that is
hateful, to stay only within the confines of a free speech entitlement).
And down in that quagmire of social policy line-drawing details what
you have is inevitable disagreement between people just as nice and as
smart and as well-meaning as you, and yes, as some committee of exlawyer judges.11
So if you believe in democracy12 a bill of rights is highly problematic
— unless you just suppose or assume that the 5-4 decision of a top court
has some mystical correlation with what actually is the timeless, fundamental rights-respecting answer. In other words, it is problematic unless
you assume that unelected ex-lawyer judges have superior moral antennae to your average voter and that their judicial verdict on rights issues is
better — morally better — than the electorate’s majority verdict.
And of course there are further difficulties about not according
people a right to participate in key public decisions (think same-sex
marriage, think when tobacco companies can advertise, think every
major Charter decision since 1982), this denied right to participate
seemingly lying at the core of treating individuals as autonomous,

10
11

note 2.

Id.
For those interested in my much more fully argued position, see the pieces cited supra,

12
And I mean democracy in the procedural sense, not some morally pregnant sense where
the moral goodness of a substantive outcome determines whether the jurisdiction counts as a
democracy. See “Thin Beats Fat Yet Again – Conceptions of Democracy”, supra, note 2.
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respect-deserving agents — a core pre-supposition of the modern human
rights movement.13
So there are all the variants of objections related to how judges
garner too much power under these instruments, how they themselves
decide rights issues on a procedural, count-heads, majority rules basis (five
votes beat four, full stop), as well as the straight-out consequentialist
objection to bills of rights that says that in a well-functioning democracy
legislators (on average, over time) do at least as well as unelected judges
in achieving rights-respecting outcomes — which happens to be my
view. And such legislators have considerably more legitimacy to be
making these decisions than judges — which procedural buttressing
point is also my view as it happens.
For the rest of this paper it is only that last consequentialist claim
that will be my focus, the one arguing that elected legislators do at least
as well as unelected judges in producing rights-respecting outcomes. And
I will now confine myself to freedom of the press issues, or at least the
subset of such issues that covers hate speech and defamation.
My claim will be that Australia, without any sort of national bill of
rights at all, has at least as much press freedom as does Canada with its
Charter.
Let me start with hate speech laws. Even a passing acquaintance with
the Mark Steyn-Macleans saga with section 13 of the Canadian Human
Rights Act14 (and various provincial equivalents) would suffice to show
that hate speech laws can and do have an effect on the press, on what it
might or might not be able to publish, and concomitantly on what can be
thought of as the “chilling effect” of the mere threat of being dragged
before some human rights commission where the complainant has every
single dollar of his or her legal costs paid for by the taxpayer while the
accused — the party alleged to have transgressed these hate speech
provisions — has to pay his or her own way.
Put more bluntly, even if you end up winning you lose. Steyn and
Macleans eventually had every single legal action against them dropped
or ended or dismissed and yet they were out of pocket very large sums
13
This is the basis on which Jeremy Waldron argues against constitutionalized bills of
rights. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
and “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346. My differently
focused but largely sympathetic analyses of Waldron are in “Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s
Stone” (2008) 45 San Diego L. Rev. 133 and “The Travails of Justice Waldron” in Grant Huscroft,
ed., Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008) 161.
14
R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.
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indeed. I had originally written that those costs were well into six figures
but a friend and former lawyer colleague of mine on Bay Street laughed
at me when he read that and said that I had been out of practice for too
long. He told me that the cost to Macleans or its insurers probably hit
seven figures. Since then I have had even better information that the
costs to them were about $2.5 million.
No one who cares about a free press can pretend that sort of outcome
does not deter those who lack the deep pockets of Macleans. Or at any
rate, if you can make that claim with a straight face then in my view you
ought to move to Los Angeles and look for acting work.
So let us look more closely at the state of hate speech laws in Canada, assuming as I do that any such laws do affect the scope of a free
press to publish things many would consider part of the give-and-take of
life in a democratic polity.
We can simplify things by separating criminal and non-criminal hate
speech restrictions. Only the latter is likely to be relevant to a discussion
of freedom of the press, though the leading Supreme Court of Canada
cases, respectively, are R. v. Keegstra15 (in the criminal realm) and
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor16 (in the civil).
In Taylor, a 5-4 majority decision, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the section 13 regulation of what was considered hate
speech, under which civil remedies are available aimed at compensating
complainants and discouraging speakers outside the criminal law. In
brief, the majority held that section 13 infringed the freedom of expression guarantee but that this infringement was justifiable under section 1
of the Charter, the abridging provision. Chief Justice Dickson for the
majority pointed to such factors as the reduced worth of hate speech, the
fact the remedies were civil (not penal) in nature and the importance of
the goal of protecting minorities in arguing that the section 13 free
speech infringement was justified. Meanwhile then Justice McLachlin, in
her dissent, disagreed, arguing that section 13 gave the Human Rights
Commission too much discretion, that it had a “chilling effect”, and that
the restriction was framed in overbroad terms.
For our purposes one single and immediate point to make is that the
Charter, or more accurately put “the interpretation of some vague,
amorphous rights guarantee and equally indeterminate reasonable limits

15
16

[1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.).
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taylor”].
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provision” by a majority of the then top Canadian judges, did nothing to
extend freedom of the press.
If you dislike section 13 the judges let you down. If you like section
13 they ended up adding nothing to the equation. Or rather, they added
nothing other than what follows from the assumption that the answers to
all political disputes can be (and should be) found by vetting laws against
constitutionalized rights provisions (as interpreted by a committee of exlawyers), an assumption open to serious doubt.17 And one that makes it
harder to repeal such legislation once the top judges, even on a 5-4 basis,
have given it a tick of being in accord with what (they happen to think,
by majority vote) are people’s timeless, transcendent fundamental rights.
I am delighted to say that at the final stages of preparing this paper, a
private member’s bill in Canada to rid it of section 13 was passed
through the House of Commons and now only awaits passage through
the unelected Senate — which is close to a certainty in my view —
before it will be repealed. And that repeal will have been accomplished
the way it should be in my view, by the elected legislature not by the
unelected judges.
I am also aware that the Whatcott case18 has been argued at the
Supreme Court, with the decision due in the not too distant future.
Whatcott involves a constitutional challenge to Saskatchewan’s section
14(1)(b) Saskatchewan Human Rights Code19 hate speech law, on the
basis that it infringes the Charter’s section 2 freedom of expression
and/or freedom of religion guarantees. And I realize that a decision in
Whatcott to invalidate Saskatchewan’s hate speech law may conceivably
even involve the justices saying that Taylor is now bad law.
But you should realize that this is at core a philosophical, political
and moral dispute grounded in competing versions of why free speech
and a free press matter, that unelected top judges have absolutely no extra
expertise in such matters, that the political, democratic system could
deliver either the pro- or anti-section 13 outcomes, and that if anything
the Charter, once a precedent like Taylor is in place, makes repeal
considerably more difficult. It has a tendency to lock in legislation.
Let me try to support those claims by turning to Australia. As it happens, there is a fairly close analogy there to the Mark Steyn saga. A
17

See, for example, Adam Tomkins, “In Defence of the Political Constitution” (2002) 22
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 170.
18
Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, appeal heard and reserved October
12, 2011, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 155 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whatcott”].
19
S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1.
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newspaper columnist, Andrew Bolt, was taken to court under the 1995
amendment to the Racial Discrimination Act20 that created section 18C.21
This section, in an Orwellian way, makes some conduct unlawful, but not
a criminal offence. It does so if your speech or act “is reasonably likely
... to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate” others, and done because of
their race (among other things). There is then section 18D, which gives
exemptions if what you said was done reasonably and in good faith,
including as part of a fair comment on a matter of public interest.
Basically this is an Australian national statutory provision that imposes non-penal hate speech restrictions. After a trial at first instance Mr.
Bolt and the Herald Sun newspaper lost. (The opinions voiced here
related not to demographics and Islam but rather to affirmative action
benefits flowing to self-identifying Aboriginals who appeared, genetically, to have little Aboriginal blood.)
The Australian statutory provision looks less broad than Canada’s
hate speech provisions, and seemingly has stronger built-in speech
protecting defences. But the first instance Australian judge did not
interpret the statute that way. For instance, the judge interpreted the
section 18C “reasonably likely to offend” test to be one that is assessed
by reference to some objective member of those claiming victimhood —
not by reference to a reasonable member of the community at large — as
well as holding that the onus of proof for triggering the section 18D
exemption lay on Bolt, while reading in a “what is deemed to be gratuitously offensive can’t claim the exemption” rider. Moreover, as no
monetary penalties applied — the remedy was simply a judge-dictated
pseudo-apology having to be run by the paper — the newspaper insurers
refused to appeal, though my publicly stated newspaper column opinion
at the time was that Bolt would have won an appeal.
In Australia too you can see that the real speech inhibitor is the chilling effect of the threat of expensive litigation where complainants have
their costs covered and the newspaper and writer do not.
My comparative point is that press freedom is no less protected in
Australia. If, like me, you dislike hate speech laws, you gain some
comfort from the fact the Australian Opposition party has pledged in
unequivocal terms to repeal at least most of these provisions while
simultaneously to buttress the section 18D defences, and has done so

20
21

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).
See Eatock v. Bolt, [2011] FCA 1103 (F.C.A.).
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more directly and overtly than Mr. Harper’s Tories did, and without
hoping for any cover from the courts.
And if you noticed that Mr. Bolt lost in Australia while the Human
Rights Commission actions against Mr. Steyn were all ultimately
dismissed (in Ontario on the basis of that Commission having no
jurisdiction), you need also to consider that in Australia the Bolt case
is virtually the only civil hate speech action there has been while in
Canada there have been many, with many accused (if we can use that
word) losing — including the stand-up comedian Guy Earle in British
Columbia.
And in more general terms you should likewise bear in mind the
need to avoid falling victim to the fallacy of the frozen legislature
assumption, the vague notion that when it comes to rights and respecting
rights, the output of the elected legislature in Canada was somehow
frozen as of 1982, and so had there never been the Charter no advances
on the rights front would ever have emanated from a bill of rightslacking legislature these past 30 years — a nonsense when you specifically articulate the point but a not unheard of implicit assumption from
Charter defenders.
I repeat, then, that from any perspective — either in favour of section
13 type hate speech laws or against them — a comparison with Australia
does not indicate that the Charter has improved freedom of the press. If
you see this issue in terms of having to make a debatable, contestable
social policy line-drawing call, and one where a committee of ex-lawyers
has not a scintilla of extra moral, political or philosophical expertise,
then that is hardly surprising.
What about defamation laws though, an area of law with obvious
implications for freedom of the press? Let me start this time with
Australia, which sits somewhere between the U.S. and the U.K. in
striking the balance between the competing social goods or goals of
protecting people’s reputations from attacks by others (on the one hand)
and the desire to leave people with lots of scope to pass comment on
others’ conduct and character (on the other). Obviously any balance
struck needs to give some weight to protecting people’s characters from
at least knowingly and maliciously false and outrageous slanders.
Likewise, any balance needs to concern itself with the bad consequences
that might flow if speakers need dead certainty and rock-solid proof
before making claims, of the dangers of stifling not just false allegations
but also true ones.
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Put differently, there is a world of difference between something
being true and one’s being able to prove it is true in a court of law where
the onus of proof is on you (the defamation defendant) to prove it.
We are talking, again, about where to draw highly debatable, contestable social policy lines seeking to balance two social goods that are in
conflict. The Americans go further than anywhere else in favouring the
wide-open speech side of the ledger, especially when the allegations are
against public figures — though even there a knowingly false and
malicious allegation will lead to a successful defamation action (if you
prove as much). Meanwhile the traditional British balance gives considerably more weight to protecting people’s reputations, to the point that its
courts have on occasion been characterized in terms of their receptivity
to “libel tourism”.
I am revealing no secrets when I point out that in purely legal terms
the U.S. balance gives the press more scope than anywhere else to write
things about people without fear of a lawsuit, even things that on
occasion may prove to be unwarranted or false. Of course if we cast our
gaze up from the purely legal and consider as well cultural factors such
as the ethos of the press (and I think now of the British tabloid press) and
its willingness to pay significant defamation damages to the odd litigant
in order to achieve million-plus sales, then matters are not nearly so clear
as to whether the press in the U.S. or the U.K. is more apt “to speak truth
to power” (and to puffed up, holier-than-thou celebrities).
But my point, again, is that a comparison of Canada to Australia visà-vis the defamation law regime in each jurisdiction gives us no grounds
for thinking the Charter does anything at all to promote a more rightsrespecting outcome.
First, and to repeat myself, it is a highly contestable and everywhere
debated issue as to which drawn line is most rights-respecting or best or
least bad in this exercise of balancing reputation against scope to publish
what sometimes may be false claims.
Second, if we simply assume that the U.S. end of the spectrum, the
more scope for speech end, is preferable, then Australia does at least as
well as Canada — possibly better.
For those who would like a brief, up-to-date account of the law of
defamation in Australia, the one provided by Justice Peter Applegarth, a
judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland, is the place to look.22 Let me
22
See Justice Peter Applegarth, “Distorting the Law of Defamation” (2011) 30 U.Q.L.J. 99
[hereinafter “Applegarth”].
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here give away the punch line and tell you that in the 1997 case of Lange
v. Australian Broadcasting Corp.23 the High Court of Australia created a
special category of common law qualified privilege for communications
about government and political matters — meaning a defence for
speakers and publishers even where truth cannot ultimately be proven in
court (though some states in Australia already had a statutory defence of
qualified privilege that covered this). Basically, a publisher has to act
reasonably in the circumstances and without malice to trigger this
privilege or defence related to governmental or political matters. And
“reasonable in the circumstances” means the publisher has “reasonable
grounds for believing that the imputation was true, took proper steps, so
far as they were reasonably open, to verify the accuracy of the material
and did not believe the imputation was untrue”.24 And this is in addition
to the traditional defence of qualified privilege that does not require
reasonableness, and in some circumstances gives wider protection25 (for
example, as regards matters of public interest outside government and
political matters).
This Lange defence superseded a “constitutionalized” defamation
defence and is related to what in Australia is known as the implied right
to freedom of political communication,26 albeit in a complicated and
contentious way. Luckily for our purposes we can leave the position in
Australia at that.
Meanwhile the state of Canada’s Charter-driven defamation law regime is more or less this. The more traditional British-style balance,
giving a good deal more weight to protecting reputation than does U.S.
defamation law, was moved or altered in Grant v. Torstar Corp.27 along
the spectrum a bit towards the U.S. position (though still falling a good
deal short of where the U.S. line is drawn). The Supreme Court of
Canada opted for a new rule “that gives greater scope to freedom of
expression while offering adequate protection of reputation ... [this new
defence requiring publishers to] establish that they acted responsibly in
attempting to verify the information [published related to] a matter of
public interest”.28 Call this the “defence of responsible communication”,
requiring judges to think the topic is a matter of public interest and that
23
24
25
26
27
28

(1997), 189 C.L.R. 520 (H.C.A.) [hereinafter “Lange”].
Id., at 574.
See Roberts v. Bass (2002), 212 C.L.R. 1 (H.C.A.).
See Applegarth, supra, note 22.
[2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
Id., at paras. 66, 85.
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the publisher was diligent in trying to verify the allegations (given the
circumstances), and you can see that this new defence will sometimes
offer protection when published claims ultimately prove to be untrue —
or what is not quite the same, when the publisher is unable to prove their
truth in court. Something similar applies to wholly private law cases not
directly governed by the Charter, because we are told in WIC Radio Ltd.
v. Simpson29 that the common law (i.e., purely judge-made law) is to be
guided by Charter values.
Meantime, in a case that is no doubt of interest to journalists, the Supreme Court held in 2010 that there is no basis for recognizing a classbased constitutional or quasi-constitutional journalist-source privilege
under either the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter.30
So that gives you a bit of detail as regards the state of the defamation
law regimes in Canada and Australia. But my larger point is that both
countries’ regimes fall easily within what the vast preponderance of
people would consider some rights-respecting core. And for pro-asmuch-scope-to-speak-as-possible people like me, neither country
matches the U.S. but Australia does at least as well as Canada, possibly
better. Put more bluntly, bill of rights-lacking Australia does every bit as
well as Charter-dominated Canada in terms of defamation law in giving
people lots of scope to speak their minds.
Precisely the same goes for hate speech laws in both countries as
they relate to freedom of the press, as we have seen.
My conclusion then, one that will be surprising to some I suspect, is
that Canada’s entrenched Charter adds nothing to freedom of the press if
Canada is being compared to its closest constitutional cousin Australia,
and so tangentially to what it might have looked like today without the
Charter.
Of course that conclusion rests on my preference for an extensive,
hardly-limited-at-all protection of free speech entitlements, and nothing
about that preference is self-evidently best or correct. It will vary for
each of us. More tellingly, perhaps, the same person’s preference for an
expansive, hardly-limited-at-all protection for this right will not always
translate to that right or to all rights, or to all Charter-enumerated rights.
For each of us, where we draw the line will vary from right to right. The
same goes for the top judges. The same goes for the elected legislators.
29
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That means that those readers who think the free speech right works
particularly well for my argument here, because the judges have allowed
more inroads or limitations on it than they might have, or than they have
as regards some other favoured right, still would have to show that all
rights ought always to be given the hardly-limited-at-all treatment. (And
few think this and anyway that case, in my view, is nearly impossible to
make in any persuasive way.) Or they would have to show that where the
Canadian judges happened to have drawn these contestable lines across
the whole range of enumerated rights is better than where elected
legislatures would have drawn them, and better by a big enough margin
to outweigh the democratic illegitimacy attaching to a “judges have the
last word” procedure. (Another tough argument in my view.)
The undeniable truth is that smart, well-informed, reasonable people
disagree about all those social policy line-drawing calls articulated in the
language of rights. It is as simple as that. What differs between Australia
and Canada is whether it is the top judges or the elected legislature that
has, for all practical purposes, the final word on these issues.

